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Teens, Porn, and Video Games:
Is it Time to Rethink Ginsberg?
John A. Humbach1
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment
Merchants Association,2 a Ninth Circuit decision that struck down, on First Amendment
grounds, a California statute prohibiting the sale or rental of certain “violent video
games” to minors.3 In finding the California statute unconstitutional, the Court of
Appeals distinguished Ginsberg v. New York, the 1968 case in which the Supreme Court
first suggested that First Amendment protections of speech may apply less strictly to
minors.4 The reason that the Ninth Circuit gave was that the Ginsberg Court had “placed
the magazines at issue within a sub-category of obscenity--obscenity as to minors,”
noting that the “Supreme Court has carefully limited obscenity to sexual content.”5
However, this explanation does not provide any obvious policy reason for differentiating
between allegedly harmful violent materials and allegedly harmful sex-themed materials.
Because the case is highly problematic precedent, the Supreme Court should rethink
Ginsberg when deciding Entertainment Merchants.
The issue in Ginsberg was whether a state could validly prohibit the sale of
“girlie” magazines to persons under age seventeen.6 The Court upheld the ban even
though the magazines were “not obscene for adults,”7 reasoning that “even where there is
1

Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
Decided sub nom. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th
Cir. 2009), aff’g 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
3
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2006). § 1746.1 provides that “[a] person may
not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video game to a minor.” §
1746(d)(1) defines “violent video game” as one in which players can engage on-screen in
“killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being” in a
manner that:
2

(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a
deviant or morbid interest of minors [and]
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is
suitable for minors [and]
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors.
The statute also contained an alternative definition of “violent video game,” but the state
conceded its unconstitutionality, so it was not before the court. Video Software, 556 F.3d
at 956.
4
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
5
Video Software, 556 F.3d at 959. See infra text accompanying notes 12–13.
6
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
Id. at 634.
1

an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .’”8 In other words,
Ginsberg authorized states to punish the dissemination of constitutionally protected
material9 to adolescents and, inferentially, to deprive adolescents of the fundamental right
to “view and observe” material of their own choosing. 10 Part of the Court’s rationale
was that state legislatures have the power to “adjust” the constitutional definition of
obscenity in order to regulate material that would otherwise fall within the area of
constitutionally protected expression.11
In Entertainment Merchants, the Ninth Circuit could have distinguished Ginsberg
on the ground that California did not even purport to “adjust” the constitutional definition
of obscenity. Instead, it said the Ginsberg holding was limited and concerned only with
“‘sex material’ as it relates to the interests of minors.”12 It declined to extend the
Ginsberg rationale to “materials depicting violence,”13 although those materials
potentially raise similar concerns about harm to minors.14 The Ninth Circuit did not
provide a rationale for curtailing First Amendment interests in one instance and
protecting those interests in the other.
The opinion in Ginsberg, if not the result, is an odd duck in First Amendment
jurisprudence. Ginsberg applied rational basis review in an area where the Supreme
8

Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding
application of a child labor state law prohibiting children from distributing religious
literature in the streets)).
9
Sexually-themed material is protected by the Constitution so long as it is not obscene.
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000). Laws restricting such
material on the basis of content are presumptively unconstitutional, and they can stand
only if the governmental can show that they pass strict scrutiny. Id. at 815.
10
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969) (recognizing the individual’s
fundamental right to “read or observe what he pleases”). Stanley was decided a year after
Ginsberg and the Court’s language gave no hint that the fundamental right confirmed in
Stanley was age-contingent. Assuming that Stanley did not implicitly overrule Ginsberg,
then it seems still to be the law that minors do not have a fundamental right to view nonobscene materials of their own choosing. In other words, it seems that legislatures still
are, per Ginsberg, fully empowered to determine and limit what minors have a right to
read and view.
Stanley actually went further than merely confirming the fundamental right to
view non-obscene materials and held that individuals have, in the privacy of their own
homes, a constitutional right to read and observe non-protected speech. While the Court
has made clear since Stanley that the First Amendment does not prevent laws to restrict
the dissemination, as opposed to the possession, of obscene expression, it is not clear how
these later holdings apply to the kind of expression suppressed in Ginsberg.
11
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638. This rationale of the Court is further examined and
critiqued infra Part I.
12
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 960 (9th Cir. 2009).
13
Id.
14
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637.
2

Court now insists on strict or at least intermediate scrutiny.15 The Court’s use of rational
basis review in Ginsberg is sometimes explained by stressing the obscenity aspect of the
case, since obscene expression is not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.16
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court conceded that the material before it in Ginsberg was
“not obscene for adults,”17 and the Court never suggested that the material was
unprotected speech.18 Therefore, the crucial question in Ginsberg was whether a state
could restrict the dissemination of protected speech because of its content.
Like the Ginsberg statute, the Entertainment Merchants statute imposes a contentbased restriction on constitutionally protected speech, specifically “violent” video games.
The purpose of the Entertainment Merchants statute is to prevent harm that the material
might cause to children. If the Court decides to use Entertainment Merchants as an
opportunity to rethink Ginsberg, it has several options.
The Court could confirm the basic Ginsberg holding and extend it by analogy to
any material so long as a legislature “might rationally conclude” that exposure to the
material constitutes an “abuse” of children that “might prevent their ʻgrowth into free and
independent well-developed [people] and citizens.ʼ”19 Another option would be to affirm
the holding of the Ninth Circuit and several other federal courts that Ginsberg is
essentially limited to its facts and does not apply to non-sexual materials such as violent
15

Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813. The more relaxed “intermediate” level of scrutiny (and its
greater deference to the legislature) would not seem applicable in a Ginsberg-type case
because, in order for intermediate scrutiny to apply, the legislative burden on expression
must be “content-neutral.” See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) (explaining that restrictions must be “justified without reference to the content of
the regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”
(quoting Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))) and
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See also Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“[M]unicipal ordinances
receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content neutral.”). However, the purported
vice of the expression in Ginsberg was precisely the effect of the particular content upon
those who were exposed to it. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811–12 (a law that “focuses only
on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners . . . is
the essence of content-based regulation.”). See also infra note 48.
16
See, e.g., Video Software, 556 F.3d at 959 (“Ginsberg is specifically rooted in the
Court’s First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence, which relates to non-protected sexbased expression . . . .”).
17
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634.
18
The Court has since specifically recognized that its decision in Ginsberg approved the
regulation of protected speech: “We held in Ginsberg . . . that the government's interest
in the ‘well-being of its youth’ and in supporting ‘parents' claim to authority in their own
household’ justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.” FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (emphasis added).
19
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640–41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165
(1944)).
3

video games.20 There is, however, no obvious policy basis for making such a distinction.
A third option would be to revisit Ginsberg’s reasoning and recast its rationale and
holding in order to place this area of law on a firmer analytical basis, one that better
accords with the rest of twenty-first century First Amendment jurisprudence.
Whichever way the Supreme Court decides Entertainment Merchants, the case is
an eminently suitable occasion to strengthen the footing of the First Amendment rights of
minors. It is well established that the state’s power to control children “reaches beyond
the scope of its authority over adults.”21 However, Ginsberg, taken on its own terms,
essentially leaves the First Amendment rights of children subject to any legislative
impulse or whim that can survive rational basis review.22 In other words, as it stands,
Ginsberg denies minors any meaningful First Amendment rights.23
Part I of this article examines how Ginsberg’s reasoning is both circular and
strikingly divergent from precedent in its view of legislative power. Part II will follow
with a discussion of how the Court might analyze the problem and issues in Ginsberg if
the case arose as a matter of first impression today. Finally, Part III will offer some
thoughts on the basic policy issue underlying Ginsberg and Entertainment Merchants,
namely, about the extent to which government should impose restrictions on the
marketplace of ideas in an effort to shape teenage minds.
I.
Ginsberg on its own terms
The specific issue in Ginsberg was whether the operator of a stationery store
could be punished for selling so-called “girlie” magazines to persons under seventeen
years of age.24 The magazines were not “obscene for adults” because they did not meet
the Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity.25 However, the Court noted, the New York

20

See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003);
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Video Software Dealers Ass'n
v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
21
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S at 165).
22
See infra text accompanying notes 73–76.
23
See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673 (arguing that the majority's reasoning seems to say that
“the States and cities and counties and villages have unlimited power to withhold
anything and everything that is written or pictorial from younger people.” (Fortas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added)).
24
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631. The prosecution was based on then N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484h (McKinney 1965). The substance of this law is now covered by N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
235.20–24 (McKinney 2008).
25
Id. at 634–35. The Supreme Court's then-current formulation was drawn from Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and articulated in the 3-part Memoirs test for
obscenity:
4

legislature had devised its own definition of obscenity for purposes of its ban on sales to
underage persons, and the state’s definition was significantly more restrictive than the
definition of obscenity formulated by the Supreme Court.26
In appealing his conviction, the defendant's “primary attack” was “leveled at the
power of the State to adapt” the Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity by extending it
to include additional material.27 Although the Ginsberg Court used the word “adapt,” the
state was actually trying to expand the concept of obscenity to include a new class of
material defined “on the basis of its appeal to minors,” and “thus exclude material so
defined from the area of protected expression.”28 The defendant argued that a state
legislature does not have the power to expand an existing category of unprotected
expression and thus withdraw constitutional protection from previously protected
expression.29 He asserted, in effect, that the states do not have the power to cut down the
scope of a constitutional right by modifying a constitutional concept.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Although the Court could have rendered its own
ruling that expanded the definition of obscenity to include the material proscribed in §
484-h of the New York Penal Law,30 it instead declared that the statute itself
accomplished the expansion. According to the Court, “§ 484-h . . . adjusts the definition
of obscenity,” adding that it “seems” clear that “the State has power to make that

(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). The Court’s current definition of
obscenity is defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
26
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635. The state’s definition added to the Supreme Court’s
definition by including any depiction of “nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic
abuse [that] is harmful to minors.” § 484-h(2)(a). Although the statute’s language
seemed to define only what the statute prohibited, not the scope of a constitutional
concept, the Supreme Court concluded that the state’s statute had adjusted the “definition
of obscenity.” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.
27
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635.
28
Id. This statement accepts the Court’s assumption that New York's statute contained a
provision “defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 . . . .” Id. at
638. However, the New York statute did not explicitly contain any such provision. See
id. at 645–47 (setting out the statute). That is to say, there was no language in the statute
that purported to define obscenity or adjust its definition. However, the Court decided
Ginsberg on the assumption that the statute did contain this language. This assumption
by the Court is central to Ginsberg’s reasoning, and that assumption continues through
the present discussion. .
29
Id. at 635.
30
See supra note 24.
5

adjustment . . . .”31 The Court thus declared that a state legislature has the power to
redefine and limit the scope of a constitutional right.
In support of this remarkable declaration, the Court cited Mishkin v. New York.32
Mishkin held that, in recognition of “social realities,” materials aimed at a “clearly
defined deviant sexual group” could be considered obscene even if they do not appeal to
the prurient interest of an “average” person.33 Prior to Mishkin, only materials having
prurient appeal to the average person were considered obscene.34
Ginsberg cannot, however, be regarded as an application of Mishkin. Unlike
Ginsberg, Mishkin expressly stated that the Court itself was making the adjustment to the
constitutional definition of obscenity.35 Mishkin did not even hint that a state legislature
could modify the scope of constitutional rights on its own. In Ginsberg, by contrast, the
Court did not adjust the definition itself, but instead stated that the statute did the
adjusting.
Another important distinction is that Mishkin’s redefinition of obscenity changed
the status of a class of expression (i.e., materials appealing to “deviant” sexual interests)
from protected to unprotected; Ginsberg did not.36 In other words, the question in
Mishkin was the scope of the Court’s own constitutional definition of obscenity.37 The
wholly different question in Ginsberg was whether, to serve a legitimate state interest, a
statute can restrict protected speech on the basis of its content.
Today, the answer to this last question would be a conditional “yes” because states
can restrict constitutionally protected speech based on content provided the restriction
meets the Supreme Court’s standard of strict scrutiny.38 For a statute to pass strict

31

Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added). Once again, the New York statute did not
actually contain any language purporting to be a definition of “obscenity.”
32
383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966).
33
Id.. at 508–09.
34
The requirement that there be prurient appeal to the average person came into
constitutional jurisprudence in Roth. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.476, 489 (1957).
Though it was not strictly speaking a part of the Memoirs formulation, it apparently was
brought along with it. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
35
Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 509.
36
The Mishkin Court withdrew protected status from “material [that] is designed for and
primarily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at
large.” Id. at 508.
37
See supra note 25 for the Memoirs formulation.
38
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see also
Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 109, 126 (1989) (“The Government may,
however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest.”). The Court in Sable did not use the expression “strict scrutiny,” but the
standard stated in the foregoing parenthetical is the strict scrutiny standard. See infra text
accompanying next footnote.
6

scrutiny, the government must demonstrate, among other things, that “the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”39
Ginsberg did not, however, employ strict scrutiny review. Instead, on the pivotal
question of whether material targeted by the statute was in fact “harmful to minors,”40 the
Court used only highly deferential rational basis review.41 Its theory for using the
rational basis standard was that “obscenity is not protected expression” and therefore, to
deny protection to “material defined as obscenity” by the state “requires only that we be
able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.”42
Using the deferential rational basis standard, the Court had no trouble finding that
a legislature “might rationally conclude . . . that exposure to the materials proscribed”
might prevent minors from growing into “free and independent well-developed men and
citizens.”43 Although the Court conceded that that the “studies all agree that a causal link

39

See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)
(commercial speech case applying intermediate scrutiny)); United States v. Nat'l Treasury
Emps.Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995). Note that Playboy was a strict-scrutiny case
quoting, with approval, the evidentiary standard laid out in an intermediate-scrutiny case
(Edenfield). Presumably, the evidentiary standard for strict scrutiny should, if anything,
be even more rigorous than the one for intermediate scrutiny and, therefore, the language
quoted in the text would show the minimum rigor of evidentiary review for a strictscrutiny case. For a fuller discussion of strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions on
speech, see infra notes 105–113 and accompanying text.
40
According to the statute at issue in Ginsberg:
ʻHarmful to minorsʼ means that quality of any description or
representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of
minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as
a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(1)(f) (McKinney 1965).
The Court stated, for example, that the limitations on expression would be justifiable as
long as “it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such
material might be harmful.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (emphasis
added).
42
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added).
43
Id. at 640–41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
7
41

has not been demonstrated,”44 the state was not required to substantiate its asserted
interest by showing that “the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree,” as it would be under today’s strict scrutiny
analysis.45 Instead, the Court deemed it sufficient “that a causal link has not been
disproved either.”46 “We . . . cannot say,” it concluded, “that § 484-h, in defining the
obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational
relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm.”47
Considering that Ginsberg was decided in 1968, it is unsurprising that the Court
used rational basis review. It would be years before the Court would delineate between
the different levels of scrutiny (strict, intermediate and rational basis) in relation to First
Amendment law48 or specifically hold that strict scrutiny applies in cases of content-

44

Id. at 642 (quoting C. Peter Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 7, 52 (1996)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
45
See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (quoting
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) (commercial speech case applying
intermediate scrutiny) (sexually-themed speech requires strict scrutiny); United States v.
Nat'l Treasury Emps.Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) . See supra note 39.
46
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 (quoting C. Peter Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of
Roth, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 7, 52 (1996)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
47
Id. at 643.
48
The applicability of the heightened scrutiny to content-based regulations of expression
did not begin to take shape until well after Ginsberg. The Court was still saying in 1972,
four years after Ginsberg, that “the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.” Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (emphasis added).
However, with a mind to the “discrimination” aspect of content-based restrictions, postMosley cases borrowed from equal protection doctrine (already mentioned in Mosley) and
allowed content-based restrictions to be imposed provided that “the legislation be finely
tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any
distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–
62 (1980). See Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 119, 126 (1989) (applying the
rule to restrictions on sexually-themed speech). However, the first instance I can find of
the term “strict scrutiny” and its current formulation in a First Amendment case is in
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813. For an interesting and concise review of how strict scrutiny
emerged as a First Amendment doctrine, see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–29 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Intermediate scrutiny first appeared in a majority opinion in the First Amendment
context in Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994). However, the
elements of intermediate scrutiny go back to a case decided a month after Ginsberg,
United States v O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), that applied what is now called
intermediate scrutiny to a regulation of expressive conduct, viz. draft-card burning.
Nothing in the Ginsberg opinion foreshadowed the soon-to-be-announced, but not
named, intermediate standard of review. However, intermediate review would not apply
8

based restrictions on sexually themed speech.49 According to the constitutional standards
of the time, the only basis on which speech suppression was permissible was “a showing
of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase ‘clear and present danger.’”50
Although protected speech could not be suppressed absent a clear and present
danger, the Court had held eleven years before Ginsberg, in Roth v. United States,51 that
the government may impose restrictions on unprotected speech, such as obscenity,
without such a danger.52 The only thing standing in the way of invoking the Roth
exception as authority for using rational basis review in Ginsberg was that the magazines
were not obscene under the Supreme Court’s definition.53 To get past this problem, the
Court fit Ginsberg under the First Amendment’s obscenity exception by reasoning that
“material defined as obscenity by § 484-h” counts as obscene.54 Therefore, the Court
decided, a rational basis for restricting the material is all that is needed.55
This reasoning does not, however, work. In its effort to fit Ginsberg under the
obscenity exception to First Amendment protection, the Court appeared to be playing a
game of polysemy — deliberately labeling two different concepts with the same word as
a way of gliding over the difference between them. The two different concepts are (i) the
constitutional concept of “obscenity” as defined by the Court,56 and (ii) the more
capacious concept that results when the constitutional concept is expanded to include the
“material defined as obscenity by § 484-h.”57 The problem with treating Ginsberg as a
case of obscenity is that the material proscribed by the New York statute covered a
substantial range of expression that is not obscenity as defined by the Court. The
expression targeted by the New York statute included constitutionally protected speech.
There is only one way to regard Ginsberg as an obscenity case and, therefore,
appropriate for lesser scrutiny, and that is to suppose that the constitutional definition of
obscenity somehow came to include “material defined as obscenity by § 484-h.”58 The
only way that inclusion could have occurred would be if the Court or the New York State
Legislature had changed the constitutional definition of obscenity. Despite the Court’s

to a case like Ginsberg today because the regulation there was pure content-based
discrimination.
49
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
50
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486–87
(1957)). See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)
(rejecting use of the rational basis test for cases involving freedoms of speech and press).
51
354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth was the first case to hold that there is an implicit exception
for obscenity in the First Amendment.
52
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641, 642 n.9. Roth referred only to constitutionally excluded
obscenity, and said nothing about variations on the obscenity concept that might be
prescribed by statutes.
53
See supra text accompanying notes 16–18.
54
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
55
See supra text accompanying notes 40–42.
56
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 338 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
57
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
58
Id.
9

language,59 it is practically inconceivable it really meant to recognize a power in the state
legislature to modify the scope of a constitutional right. Accordingly, if a definitional
change occurred the Court must have made the change itself. However, the Ginsberg
opinion nowhere said that the Court was making any such change, nor did it say it was
adopting the New York formulation. On the contrary, the Court unmistakably said
“§ 484-h . . . adjusts the definition of obscenity.”60
In sum, there is a problem with treating Ginsberg as an obscenity case and
explaining its use of rational basis review. The problem is that materials like those at
issue in Ginsberg remained non-obscene protected speech under the Supreme Court’s
operative definitions. The Supreme Court neither redefined the scope of the obscenity
concept itself, nor did it say that it adopted the supposed redefinition61 in the statute as a
constitutional formulation.62 Assuming that the state legislature lacked the power to
modify the scope of constitutional right, the Court’s use of the rational basis test would
not have been appropriate under the prevailing requirement of strict scrutiny review.
Even accepting the Court’s statement that the legislature had the power to adjust
the definition of obscenity for constitutional purposes, there is still another problem with
Ginsberg’s explanation for using rational basis review: the core line of reasoning is
circular. The Court said that the § 484-h material was obscene because the legislature
had power to redefine non-obscene material as obscene if it had a rational basis for doing
so. But the reason it needed only a rational basis to do so is that the § 484-h material was
obscene. In order to justify the use of rational basis review the Court had to assume the
conclusion, that the § 484-h material was obscene.
In establishing the rational basis test as the one to use in cases involving the First
Amendment rights of minors, Ginsberg produced an important constitutional rule by
treating material as obscene based on the supposed power of a state legislature to “adjust”
a constitutional concept. Unless the Court itself adjusted its obscenity formulation, the
material at issue in Ginsberg was protected speech restricted on the basis of content
without the application of strict scrutiny. This situation raises, at the very least, serious
questions about Ginsberg’s continued value as a precedent.

59

Id. at 638 (insisting that the legislature made the “adjustment” in the definition of
obscenity).
60
Id.
61
As noted earlier, the New York statute did not actually contain any language purporting
to be a definition of obscenity. However, since the Court decided Ginsberg on the
assumption that it did, this assumption is continued in the present discussion.
62
A footnote in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 n.10 (1975), stated
that “[i]n Ginsberg the Court adopted a variation of the adult obscenity standards
enunciated in Roth . . . and Memoirs . . . .” (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
However, the Court did not say that it had adopted the state’s formulation in the Ginsberg
opinion itself. Rather, all the opinion said was, in effect, that it could have been rational
for the state to adopt it. See supra text accompanying notes 40–42. If the Court did
indeed adopt a reformulation of its obscenity definition in either Ginsberg or Erznoznick,
it did so implicitly.
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II.
Could Ginsberg be Decided the Same Way Today?
Despite its serious analytical flaws, Ginsberg produced a core holding that has
been fairly clear. First, the Court has said that Ginsberg approved the regulation of
“otherwise protected expression”63 if “the government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its
youth’ and in supporting parental authority” justifies the regulation.64 In relation to
minors’ First Amendment rights to receive expressive material, Ginsberg established that
“the scope of the constitutional freedom . . . to read or see material concerned with sex”
can depend on the age of the person.65
This core meaning of Ginsberg does not, however, provide much guidance for
future cases. In particular, Ginsberg neither tells us how watered down the First
Amendment rights of minors actually are, nor does it offer any standards or principles
other than the rational basis test for deciding that question..66 What is more, First
Amendment law has evolved considerably since Ginsberg.
The Entertainment Merchants case now before the Court freshly presents the
same question as Ginsberg, namely, to what extent does the government’s interest in
protecting minors permit regulations that deny minors First Amendment rights to
communicate and receive communications? If Ginsberg arose as a matter of first
impression today, it is unlikely that it could be decided on the same reasoning. In light of
now-prevailing First Amendment law, the Entertainment Merchants case should not be
decided on that reasoning either.
Even if the reasoning of Ginsberg is flawed, however, there is still the question of
what value its core meaning might retain as precedent. Part II considers whether there
are alternative ways to support Ginsberg’s basic holding today.

63

FCC v. Pacifica Found. 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (describing Ginsberg).
Id. at 749–50 (quoting Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639–40). As the Court has elaborated,
Ginsberg established that there are “limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the
speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the
audience may include children,” and these limitations apply “even though the material in
question was entitled to First Amendment protection with respect to adults.” Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
65
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–65 (1997) (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636).
Based on Reno, it appears that this aspect of Ginsberg has survived the landmark right-toread case, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), which was decided one year after
Ginsberg.
66
Indeed, it does not even tell us who holds the power to decide. Do the state legislatures
have the power to modify the scope of minors’ First Amendment rights by making
adjustments in the controlling constitutional definitions, as the Court suggested? Or is
that power held by the Supreme Court alone? See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (“That the
State has power to make that adjustment seems clear.”).
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a.

Rational Basis Review as an “Independent” Rule?

The effort to justify the rational basis test in Ginsberg led to a most glaring
deviation from modern First Amendment law, namely, letting a state legislature diminish
the breadth of a constitutional right by expanding the definition of obscenity.67 This is
not, one would think, an aspect of Ginsberg that could continue to apply.
Perhaps, however, the Ginsberg opinion did not actually mean to say that state
legislatures have the power to modify the scope of First Amendment rights. The Court
might have instead meant to adopt a so-called “variable obscenity” standard, which
would permit the states some flexibility in complying with First Amendment
requirements.68 Justice Brennan, who wrote for the Court in Ginsberg, later explained
that the Court had done just that.69 The trouble is that if, indeed, the Court adopted a
“variable obscenity” standard, it did not mention that it adoption anywhere in the final
version of its opinion.70 No subsequent majority opinion has confirmed the existence of
this novel, flexible standard and a correspondingly flexible constitutional right.
The rational basis standard for cases involving minors does not, however,
necessarily have to depend on the dubious notion that states can modify the scope of
constitutional definitions and rights. Instead, it is possible to read Ginsberg as
establishing an independent rule that lesser scrutiny applies to laws aimed at preventing
harm to minors.71 Under this alternative reading of Ginsberg, regulations to protect
minors would simply be carved out from the general run of First Amendment cases and,
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See supra Part I.
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635–36. The opinion noted that the “New York Court of Appeals
‘upheld the Legislature’s power to employ variable concepts of obscenityʼ” in a prior
case using the same law as was at issue in Ginsberg. Id. (citing People v. Tannenbaum,
220 N.E.2d 783, 785 (N.Y. 1966)).
69
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas
also mentions the “variable obscenity” concept in his Ginsberg dissent, making it sound
very much as though it had been embraced in an earlier draft of the majority opinion but
was later redacted. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673. The Ninth Circuit apparently thought that
the Court had adopted a variable obscenity standard as well. Video Software Dealers
Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2009).
70
In a footnote, the Court quoted a law review article that argued that “[v]ariable
obscenity . . . furnishes a useful analytical tool,” Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 n.4 (quoting
William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 85 (1960–61)), but the references to
variable obscenity in the majority opinion fall far short of even the most oblique adoption
of a new constitutional standard.
71
Indeed, this is exactly how Justice Brennan, the author of Ginsberg, appears later to
have understood it. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1980)
(citing Ginsberg and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)) (“lesser scrutiny is
appropriate . . . because of the States’ greater latitude to regulate the conduct of
children”).
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as to them, the rational basis test would be deemed the applicable standard for reviewing
abridgments of speech.
There are, however, several objections to reading Ginsberg as establishing an
independent rule for using rational basis review for laws that affect minors’ First
Amendment rights. First of all, Ginsberg neither considered nor made any effort to
justify such an independent rule. Although the Court gave good reasons why the First
Amendment rights of minors may be less extensive than those of adults,72 it gave no
explanation (apart from its obscenity theory) why, as a matter of process, laws affecting
minors should receive less rigorous scrutiny than restrictions on speech generally.
A stronger objection to a special low-scrutiny rule for minors is that its practical
effect would be to place the First Amendment rights of young people almost totally at the
pleasure of the legislature — meaning that minors would effectively have no real First
Amendment rights at all.73 By authorizing the use of highly deferential rational basis
review, the Court would give legislatures a green light to move whole classes of
expression into categorical exclusions such as obscenity.
Moving a class of expression into a categorical exclusion allows a legislature to
bypass strict scrutiny.74 It would undermine the integrity of the strict scrutiny
requirement if new laws could remove classes of speech from its purview without
themselves being subject to strict scrutiny.75 As Justice Fortas wrote in his Ginsberg
dissent, “[t]he Court certainly cannot mean that the States and cities and counties and
villages have unlimited power to withhold anything and everything that is written or
pictorial from younger people.”76 But if the deferential rational basis test of Ginsberg
applies to cases involving minors, that “unlimited power” would be exactly the result. It
would create a veritable road around First Amendment protection for persons under
eighteen years of age.
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For example, the court discussed Prince. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638–39.
See Landmark Commc'ns v. Virginia., 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) (“A legislature
appropriately inquires into and may declare the reasons impelling legislative action but
the judicial function commands analysis of whether the specific conduct charged falls
within the reach of the statute and if so whether the legislation is consonant with the
Constitution. Were it otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be
subject to legislative definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on
legislative power would be nullified.”) (emphasis added).
74
Strict scrutiny is not required for restrictions on expression that falls within a
categorical exclusion from First Amendment protection. Compare United States v.
Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (A “content-based speech restriction . .
. can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.”) with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
486–87 (1957) (no justifications for restriction need be shown if a categorical exclusion
applies). See also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (expressions of
offers to provide child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982)
(child pornographic expression).
75
See supra note 73.
76
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673 (Fortas, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Another objection to an independent rule applying rational-basis review is that it
would be directly at odds with several post-Ginsberg decisions.77 For example, in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,78 the Court showed no inclination
to reverse the First Amendment presumption of invalidity because minors were involved.
“Students in school . . . are ‘persons' under our Constitution. . . . They may
not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of
expression of their views.”79
True, the Tinker case dealt with communications by minors, not communications to
minors (and, inferentially, their right to receive such communications), but the Supreme
Court has never, at least yet, given any indication that the First Amendment interests in
receiving expressive content are inferior to the interests in providing it. Only by
dubiously regarding Ginsberg as an obscenity case was it possible for the Court to justify
the use of rational basis review.
In the 1989 case of Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court held exactly the
opposite as Ginsberg with respect to the applicable level of review. Like Ginsberg, Sable
involved a law that was intended to prevent the dissemination of sexual material to
minors, specifically “dial-a-porn.” To do so, the law in Sable placed content-based
restrictions on “indecent” telephone communications.80 Sable followed Ginsberg in part,
acknowledging that government has “a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors,” which “extends to shielding minors from the
influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.”81 However, the Court
departed from Ginsberg by prescribing a test that amounts to what we now call strict
scrutiny.82 “[T]o withstand constitutional scrutiny,” wrote the Court, government must
use “narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily
interfering with First Amendment freedoms.”83 Even more pertinently, the Court stated
77

E.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (2000) (requiring strict scrutiny review of content-based
restrictions for the purpose of prevent access by minors to sexually-themed television
programming); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (applying the “most stringent
review” to a content-based restriction on speech); Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 119, 126 (1989) (using today’s strict scrutiny standards in reviewing regulation
to prevent exposure of minors to sexually-themed speech).
78
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
79
Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
80
Sable, 492 U.S. at 117–18, 123. The Court at some points referred to the regulation as
a “ban,” but in fact only communications for commercial purposes were banned. Id. at
123.
81
Id. at 126.
82
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). See also infra text
accompanying note 105.
83
Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (quoting Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)).
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that “whatever deference is due legislative findings would not foreclose our independent
judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.”84 “Deference to a
legislative finding,” wrote the Court, “cannot limit judicial inquiry when First
Amendment rights are at stake.”85 At least since 1989, to uphold a law cutting back free
expression interests to protect minors it is not enough merely to be “able to say that it was
not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the
statute is harmful to minors.”86
The use of rational-basis review in First Amendment cases involving minors is
also at odds with United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,87 where the Court left no
doubt that “a content-based speech restriction . . . can stand only if it satisfies strict
scrutiny.”88 Like Sable and Ginsberg, Playboy concerned a law intended to prevent
sexual material, in this instance sexual cable television programming, from reaching
minors.89 While the Court in Playboy clearly focused on the law as a “restriction of
communication between speakers and willing adult listeners”90 its broad pronouncements
about First Amendment policy and goals did not except minors. “[W]ere we to give the
Government the benefit of the doubt when it attempted to restrict speech,” wrote the
Court, “we would risk leaving regulations in place that sought to shape our unique
personalities or to silence dissenting ideas.”91 Thus, the Court stated flatly, “[c]ontentbased regulations are presumptively invalid,” and that “the usual presumption of
constitutionality . . . is reversed.”92
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear since Ginsberg, if it was not already
clear before,93 that when laws restrict speech on the basis of content, strict scrutiny
applies94—even if, as in Sable,95 Reno,96and Playboy,97 the purpose of the law is to
84

Id. at 129.
Id. (quoting Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)).
86
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added). For more quotations stating the
applicable standards for substantiating harm, see infra text accompanying notes 109–111.
87
529 U.S. 803 (2000).
88
Id. at 813.
89
Id. at 806.
90
Id. at 812 (“To prohibit this much speech is a significant restriction of communication
between speakers and willing adult listeners, communication which enjoys First
Amendment protection.”) (emphasis added).
91
Id. at 818.
92
Id. at 817; accord, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Contentbased regulations are presumptively invalid.”); cf. e.g. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434, 449 (2002) (plurality opinion & Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing same rule); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (same).
93
See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (rejecting use of the rational basis test for cases involving
freedoms of speech and press).
94
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (“Where a law is
subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will
sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does not have the
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restrict access to sexual materials by minors. Use of the rational basis standard is also at
odds with rule that content-based restrictions on speech and press are presumptively
invalid.98 Certainly, if Ginsberg were decided today, something more than its flawed and
circular reasoning99 should be required to overcome the holdings and strong statements of
First Amendment goals and policies contained in cases that have since been decided.
Finally, a special rule of lesser scrutiny for cases involving minors is inconsistent
with the principle that “only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may
government bar public dissemination of protected materials” to minors.100 In fact, such a
rule for minors would effectively defeat this principle in practice. It is one thing to say
that “a State or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative
materials available to youths than on those available to adults,”101 but it is impermissible
to give the state or municipality the final say on such controls. Only if there is genuine
scrutiny over governmental restrictions on expression by and to minors can the
restrictions be confined to “relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances.”102
In summary, it would be problematic to apply Ginsberg today as precedent for the
proposition that lesser scrutiny is appropriate for First Amendment cases involving
dissemination of expression to minors. No doubt the states have “greater latitude to
regulate the conduct of children,”103 but that broad truism says nothing about the standard
to be used in deciding the limits on that latitude. Ginsberg regarded restrictions on
expression to be justifiable as long as it was “rational for the legislature to find that the
minors' exposure to such material might be harmful.”104 In that respect, Ginsberg’s
reasoning is out of step with modern First Amendment jurisprudence, even as to minors,
and should not be applied in the pending Entertainment Merchants case.

same controlling force.”). See also Playboy, 529 U.S. at 81; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382;
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991).
95
See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 119, 126 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to a regulation to prevent exposure of minors to sexually-themed speech).
96
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (applying the “most stringent review” to
a content-based restriction on speech in the Internet context).
97
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
98
See supra note 92 and accompanying text. The rational-basis test of constitutional
validity inherently embodies exactly the opposite presumption – specifically, the
presumption that the statute is valid unless no “state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain” it. Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934).
99
See supra Part I.
100
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1975).
101
Id. at 212.
102
Id. at 212–13.
103
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1980).
104
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (emphasis added).
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b.

Ginsberg under the strict scrutiny standard.

The Court's explanation of Ginsberg as a rational basis case does not per se mean
it could not come out the same way if analyzed under the modern “strict scrutiny”
standard. Under strict scrutiny, a content-based restriction “must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest,” and there must be no “less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose.”105
In the Ginsberg context, the element of “compelling interest” should be easy to
meet. Indeed, the Ginsberg Court identified two interests that could potentially serve as
the “compelling” interests that, if substantiated, would satisfy strict scrutiny today.106
They were: (1) the state’s interest in supporting parents and others, such as teachers, who
have primary responsibility for the well-being of children, and (2) the state’s
“independent interest in the well-being of its youth.”107
The crucial question, however, is whether the alleged harm on which these two
interests are predicated exists in fact. The Ginsberg Court admitted it was “very
doubtful” that the crucial legislative finding of harm “expresses an accepted scientific
fact.”108 Nonetheless, it accepted that finding anyway. Whatever else may be said of
such reasoning, it is not “strict scrutiny.”
Today, in order for a statute to pass strict scrutiny (or even intermediate scrutiny),
“the Government . . . must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and
material way.”109 Rather than simply defer to the legislature as it did in Ginsberg, the
Court must use its “independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of
constitutional law.”110 It must “assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has
drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”111
In short, the Court “may not simply assume that the ordinance will always
advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive
activity.”112 On the contrary,
[A law that burdens free expression] requires a justification far stronger
than mere speculation about serious harms. “Fear of serious injury cannot
105

United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
106
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 641.
109
United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
110
Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) (emphasis added).
111
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (Kennedy, J., plurality)
(applying O'Brien test).
112
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (quoting Members
of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 n.22
(1984)) (emphasis added).
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alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared
witches and burnt women. . . . To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced.”113
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether there is adequate scientific
evidence to support a conclusion that viewing erotic materials is harmful to minors, and
to teens in particular. If there is not, then Ginsberg could not on its record be decided the
same way today using the now-prevailing strict scrutiny standard for content-based
regulations of speech. Likewise, the outcome of the Entertainment Merchants case
should depend on whether there is adequate scientific evidence to support a conclusion
that playing “violent” video games is harmful to teens.
III.
Ginsberg and Mind Control for Teens
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power
to control men's minds.114
Reduced to its basics, the central policy question in Ginsberg was whether and to
what extent government should be able to control what minors see, read, and hear. While
there is good reason to think that government control of teenage minds is a generally bad
thing, there are undoubtedly many who see value in such control. Arguably, at least,
government should not simply leave the development of teenagers’ personalities, tastes,
attitudes, and values to their families, parents and other people in their lives. Rather, one
could argue, government exists not just to serve its citizens but to shape them as well.
The idea that government has a legitimate role in shaping teenagers’ personalities, tastes,
attitudes and values by limiting what they see and hear is usually expressed with calls for
restricting minors’ access to certain kinds of expressive material and in legislation
responding to those calls.115
While the Supreme Court has never found an “indoctrination exception” to the
First Amendment, some of the reasoning in the public school cases inferentially suggests
there might be.116 Nonetheless, though the point will not be argued here, it is submitted
113

Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 475 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
114
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
115
For example, see the portion of the Communications Decency Act, codified in 47
U.S.C § 223, quoted in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (invalidating the
provision as overbroad).
116
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (allowing school to ban
advocacy of illegal drug use given the “special characteristics of the school
environment”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988) (allowing
school officials to regulate the contents of a school newspaper “in any reasonable
manner”); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (upholding ban on
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that the school cases, given their language and logic, neither expressly nor implicitly
suggest the existence of some sort of “indoctrination exception” to the First Amendment.
Their holdings are animated, rather, by a recognition of the “special characteristics of the
school environment” and the need to prevent disruption of the schools’ educational
work.117 So while it may be clear that the public schools have a legitimate role in
educating as to values,118 the cases do not do support the idea that government has an
indoctrination interest that allows it to restrict expression as a way to suppress alternative
values. “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion. . . .”119
Depending on how one comes out on questions like these, one may or may not be
persuaded that Ginsberg represented a step in the right direction. Stated in First
Amendment terms, one may or may not think that there is a compelling governmental
interest in shielding teenagers from the social and cultural influences that might cause
them to develop outlooks and viewpoints on sex or other topics that the government
regards as “wrong.”
Whether or not such a compelling interest exists, the problem with Ginsberg is
that its rational basis test provides no vehicle for judicial examination of the issue or for
assuring that such government interests, if they exist, are furthered in an appropriately
speech-protective way. Instead, the present Ginsberg rule permits Congress, state and
even local legislatures to impose wholesale embargoes on what young people may see,
read and hear. It gives legislative bodies an essentially free hand to obstruct teens’ access
to essentially any kind of material the legislators might decide does “harm.”
Wholesale embargoes on speech and expression for the purpose of shaping minds
would, of course, never be tolerated for general audiences.120 On the contrary,
individuals have a fundamental right to view and observe material of their own choosing
even if the government officials have concerns about the impact on the minds of those
who see it.121 Whether such embargoes should be permitted in the case of teens is a
different question.122 Consistently safeguarding First Amendment interests is not a duty

sexually suggestive student speech that would “undermine the school's basic educational
mission”).
117
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 394.
118
See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943).
119
Id. at 642.
120
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567–68 (1969).
121
Id. at 565 (denying that the state has “the right to protect the individual's mind from
the effects” even of unprotected speech, i.e. obscenity). The Constitution exists precisely
so that opinions and judgments, including aesthetic and moral judgments about art and
literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says is that these
judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the
mandate or approval of a majority. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803,
818 (2000).
122
“[A] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas,
a child – like someone in a captive audience – is not possessed of that full capacity for
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that the courts can leave exclusively to the legislative branch.123 As the Court has stated,
“[i]n most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less
applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to minors.”124 As
long as freedom of expression is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny should apply
whenever legislatures regulate on the basis of content.
Presumably, the chief harm posed to teens by non-obscene sexual material might
is that it might cause them to get “wrong” ideas, attitudes or values concerning sex.
Assuming that the government has the “right” ideas, attitudes and values on sexual
matters, this is a kind of harm that government could have an interest in trying to prevent.
On the other hand, the reliability of government expertise on questions of sex is
something a person may doubt. And it must not be forgotten that minors can also suffer
harm by being deprived of access to free expression.125 It is, after all, a presupposition of
the First Amendment that reading and observing the expression of others is beneficial.126
There is ordinarily a First Amendment interest in protecting that access, an interest that is
strong enough to merit protection by the standard of strict scrutiny to protect the rights of
minors.
IV.
Conclusion
In deciding Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the
Supreme Court will have to grapple with how to apply Ginsberg v. New York.127 Rather
than gloss over or ignore the analytical flaws of Ginsberg, the Court should take the
occasion to rethink Ginsberg and to place minors’ constitutional rights on a sounder
footing that is in harmony with the rest of First Amendment law.
Using the rational basis test, Ginsberg could not be decided on the same reasoning
today nor could it have reached the same result. The Court’s choice to use lesser scrutiny
to review a law impinging on First Amendment interests is inconsistent with cases
decided since Ginsberg and the requirement of strict scrutiny that they establish.128 The
only way its reasoning could hold is if the state legislature actually had the power (as
Ginsberg asserted) to modify the scope of constitutional protections by redefining a key
constitutional concept – namely, obscenity. Despite Ginsberg’s language, it is

individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 n.11 (1975) (quoting Justice
Stewart’s concurring opinion in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)).
123
See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 119, 126, 129 (1989) and
supra text accompanying notes 77–99.
124
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 214.
125
See id.
126
See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817 (“The line between speech unconditionally guaranteed
and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn.
Error in marking that line exacts an extraordinary cost.”).
127
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
128
Supra text accompanying notes 77–99.
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inconceivable that the Supreme Court would recognize such a power in a state legislature
today. Therefore, in the absence of some new, independent principle (of which the Court
has not yet even hinted), the Ginsberg decision to use the rational basis test is without a
sound foundation under modern First Amendment law.
Bringing this area of law into harmony with the rest of First Amendment law
would mean that, in reviewing content-based restrictions intended to protect minors (such
as those in Entertainment Merchants), the courts should apply the same presumption of
invalidity and strict scrutiny that are applicable to content-based restrictions enacted for
other purposes.129 That is to say, content-based restrictions to protect minors must be
“narrowly tailored” to promote a “compelling Government interest,” with no “less
restrictive alternative,”130 and in substantiating that interest “the Government . . . must
demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”131
Ultimately, the policy concern in cases like Ginsberg and Entertainment
Merchants involves governmental efforts to imbue young people with attitudes, outlooks,
and viewpoints toward sex and depictions of violence that fall within a certain officially
approved range. Whether the youth of today will eventually conform to these officially
fostered attitudes, outlooks and viewpoints as the adults of tomorrow is, of course, an
open question but, if history is a guide, they probably will not.
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Id.
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The more relaxed
intermediate level of scrutiny (and its greater deference to the legislature) would not
apply in the Ginsberg situation as such application requires the legislative burden on
expression must be “content-neutral.” See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) (restrictions must be “justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and .
. . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”);
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 41 (1986). See also Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“[M]unicipal
ordinances receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content neutral.”). However, the
purported vice of the expression in Ginsberg was precisely the effects of the particular
content on those who were exposed to it.
131
United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995).
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